1997年伯克希尔年会:风险不来自于市场,而是来自于公司
Drawings from AMY
WARREN BUFFETT: Now, let’s go back to your first question. Give it to me again.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The first part was, would you define — give us your definition of stock market risk and how it differs from the standard definition.
股东:能否说一下你对股票市场风险的定义,以及这跟传统定义之间的区别。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We don’t think in terms of — well, we think first in terms of business risk, you know.
巴菲特:我们通常只考虑公司的风险,而不考虑股票市场的风险。
We — the key to Benjamin Graham’s approach to investing is not thinking of stocks as stocks or part of a stock market. Stocks are part of a business. People in this room own a piece of a business. If the business does well, they’re going to do all right as long as they don’t pay way too much to join into that business.
我的导师本杰明格雷厄姆把投资看作买入公司,而不是买“股票”。就像所有这个房间里的人都拥有伯克希尔的一部分。这样思考的话,只要公司变得越来越好,那么他们也会过得越来越好。当然,前提是你没有为拥有这家公司付出过高的成本。
So we look at — we’re thinking about business risk. Now, business risk can arise in various ways. It can arise from the capital structure when somebody sticks a ton of debt into some business, and so that if there’s a hiccup in the business that the lenders foreclose.
所以,首先我们关注公司的风险。公司的风险可以来自很多方面。可能来自资本借贷结构,如果公司有一笔很大的债务,那借不到钱的时候公司就有可能会运营不下去。
It can come about just by the nature of the — certain businesses are just very risky. Back in — when there were more commercial aircraft manufacturers, Charlie and I would think of making a commercial airplane, a big airliner, sort of as a bet-your-company risk because you would shove hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars out into the pot before you really had customers.
有些风险来自于这个行业的特性,有些行业天然就是高风险的代名词。比如,飞机制造行业,研发的新机型在客户愿意下单之前,就要投入巨大研发费用和沉没成本。这个成本可能大到甚至会影响公司未来的生存的运营。如果一不小心,新机型研发出现一些问题,公司就可能会破产。
And then if you had a problem with the plane, you know, that company could go. There’s certain businesses that inherently — because of long lead times, because of heavy capital investment — that basically have a lot of risk.
这类行业在见到回报之前有很长的投入期,而且如果要投入很多的研发和建设成本,那这些行业在本质上风险就很高。
And commodity businesses have risk unless you’re the low-cost producer, because the low-cost producer can put you out of business.
还有,所有的商品制造商都有一定风险,除非你的生产成本很低,否则那些低成本制造商就可以把你踢出这个游戏。
Our textile business was not the low-cost producer. And we had a fine management, and everybody worked hard. We had cooperative unions, all kinds of things. But we weren’t the low-cost producer, so it was a risky business. The guy who could sell it cheaper than we could made it risky for us.
我们以前的纺织制造业务就不是低成本制造商。即使我们有很好的管理层,大家都很努力工作,也有行业协会。但我们不是低成本制造商,最后那些可以用更低的价格把产品卖出去的公司,就成了我们的风险。(伯克希尔哈撒韦公司原是一家纺织公司)
So there’s a lot of ways businesses can be risky.
所以,一家公司面临的风险来自于各个方面。
We tend to go into businesses that inherently are low-risk, and are capitalized in a way that that low risk of the business is transformed into a low risk to the enterprise.
我们喜欢进入那些在天然特性上风险就很低的行业,并且这种行业天然的低风险要以某种方式充分体现在公司业务的运营数据里。
The risk beyond that is that even though you buy — identify — such businesses, that you pay too much for them. That risk is usually a risk of time rather than loss of principal, unless you get into a really extravagant situation.
除此之外,风险还来自于,即使你找到了这种公司,但为了买入公司支付了过高的价格。这种风险更多是会损失时间,而不是损失本金,除非遇到极端情况。
But then the risk becomes the risk of you yourself. I mean, whether you can retain your belief in the real fundamentals of the business and not get too concerned about the stock market.
然后这种风险就变成了你和你自己的较量,能不能在股票市场上上下下的时候,在已经充分研究公司的基本面的情况下,坚守住你自己搜集的事实和信仰。
The stock market is there to serve you, and not to instruct you. And that’s a key to owning a good business, and getting rid of the risk that would otherwise exist in the market.
请记住,股票市场是来服务你的,而不是指导你的。这就是拥有一个好公司的关键,不用去管来自市场的风险。
You mentioned volatility. It doesn’t make any difference to us whether the volatility of the stock market, you know, is — averages a half a percent a day or a quarter percent a day or 5 percent a day. In fact, we’d make a lot more money if volatility was higher, because it would create more mistakes in the market.
你所说的市场波动,市场每天涨跌几个点对我们来说没有啥区别。说实话,如果市场波动很大,意味着市场上错误的定价会更多,我们会赚更多的钱。
So volatility is a huge plus to the real investor.
所以,波动性对于真正的投资者来说有巨大的好处。
Ben Graham used the example of “Mr. Market,” which is the — and we’ve used it. I’ve copied it in the report. I copy from all the good writers.
本杰明格雷厄姆把股票市场看作一位“市场先生”。
And Ben said, “You know, just imagine that when you buy a stock, that you — in effect, you’ve bought into a business where you have this obliging partner who comes around every day and offers you a price at which you’ll either buy or sell. And the price is identical.”
他说,你想象一下,这位市场先生每天都会来你家门口给你报个价,问你要不要买卖你手上的股票。
And no one ever gets that in a private business, where daily you get a buy-sell offer by a party. But in the stock market you get it. That’s a huge advantage. And it’s a bigger advantage if this partner of yours is a heavy-drinking manic depressive. (Laughter)
这在没有上市的私人企业那里是不可能出现的,没人会给你每天报个价。如果这个市场先生很神经,那就更好了。一下给你报个超低价,一下又给你报个超高价。
The crazier he is, the more money you’re going to make.
他多发神经,你就能多挣钱。
So you, as an investor, you love volatility. Not if you’re on margin, but if you’re an investor you aren’t on margin. And if you’re an investor, you love the idea of wild swings because it means more things are going to get mispriced.
所以,如果你是真正的投资者,你就会超爱波动性。因为,市场上错误定价的东西会更多。当然,前提是你没有放杠杆。
Finance departments teach that volatility equals risk. Now, they want to measure risk, and they don’t know any other way. They don’t know how to do it, basically. And so they say that volatility measures risk.
传统的金融教你的是波动性越大,风险越大。那是因为他们不知道怎么去量化风险,所以他们直接把波动和风险等同起来。
And, you know, I’ve often used the example that the Washington Post stock when we first bought it had gone — in 1973 — had gone down almost 50 percent from a valuation of the whole company of close to, say, 180 or 175 million, down to maybe 80 million or 90 million.
我举一个例子,我们买华盛顿邮报的时候是1973年,当时它从1.8亿美金跌到0.8亿美金,跌了有50%。
And because it happened very fast, the beta of the stock had actually increased and a professor would have told you that the stock — company — was more risky if you bought it for 80 million than if you bought it for 170 million. Which is something that I’ve thought about ever since they told me that 25 years ago, and I still haven’t figured it out. (Laughter)
因为它跌得很快,所以公司的风险Beta上升了。这时金融学教授会告诉你,这家公司的风险在0.8亿市值的时候比1.8亿时,还要高。这是25年前别人教我的,但我到现在都还没有搞懂为什么。
理念随笔
读什么书
俺自己的穷查理宝典(1)
俺自己的穷查理宝典(2)
投资随笔
简单的复利
什么是好模式?什么又是好公司、好价格?
在烂模式下的好公司?
啥是好价格?
选择自己的能力圈
所谓投资就是算出“自由现金流”
用买产业的心态去买公司
公司随笔
如何运营一个“免费”的动物园
麦当劳的另一面
伯克希尔的另一面
伯克希尔随笔
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免责声明:上述内容仅代表发帖人个人观点,不构成本平台的任何投资建议。