AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Michael Zenga from Danvers, Massachusetts. That’s a town whose band Mr. Buffett so generously sent to the Rose Bowl parade last year, so you’re a very popular guy in my town.Good morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger.Mr. Buffett, I wanted to ask you this question last week when I ran into you after Gillette’s annual meeting, but I choked. So now that there’s no pressure, here goes. (Laughter)In the years from — from my reading — in the years from 1956 through ’69, you achieved the best results of your career quantitatively. Twenty-nine percent annually against only 7 percent for the Dow.听众：据我了解，从 1956 开始到 1969 年，是你年复合投资回报率最高的一段时间，每年的回报率达到了 29%，远远超过了当时道指的回报率 7%。Your approach then was different than now. You looked for lots of undervalued stocks with less attention to competitive advantage or favorable economics and sold them rather quickly.你当时的投资方法和现在很不一样，那时候你会寻找很多低估的股票，不太会关注竞争优势或者是护城河，而且持有不久后就会卖出这些股票。As your capital base grew, you switched your approach to buying undervalued excellent companies with favorable long-term economics.后来本金越来越多，你换了一种方法投资。你开始倾向去买那些低估的好公司，那些有竞争优势的公司。My question is, if you were investing a small sum today, which approach would you use?我的问题是，如果你今天还是只有这么点本金，你会用哪种方法去投资？WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I would use the approach that I think I’m using now of trying to search out businesses that — where I think they’re selling at the lowest price relative to the discounted cash they would produce in the future.巴菲特：我会用现在的方法，也就是去算出哪家公司现金流折现的价值跟现在市场给的估值差异最大，就买它。But if I were working with a small amount of money, the universe would be huge compared to the universe of possible ideas I work with now.但如果我只有很少的本金，我可以投资的标的的可能性会很多，远比现在多得多。You mentioned that ’56 to ’69 was the best period. Actually, my best period was before that. It was from right after I met Ben Graham in 19 — early 1951 — but from the end of 1950 through the next 10 years, actually, returns averaged about 50 percent a year. And I think they were 37 points better than the Dow per year, something like that. But that — I was working with a tiny, tiny, tiny amount of money.刚刚提到 1956 年到 1969 年是我投资回报率最高的时期。实际上，在那之前我的回报率更高。大概是我遇到了格雷厄姆之后，从 1951 年到 1960 年，当时的回报率大约是每年 50%，超过了道指 37% 左右。但当时我只管着一点点小钱。And so, I would pour through volumes of businesses and I would find one or two that I could put $10,000 into or $15,000 into that just were — they were ridiculously cheap. And obviously, as the money increased, the universe of possible ideas started shrinking dramatically.当时我大量地看各种公司，然后找到一到两个公司，把 1 万或者 1.5 万美元投到那家公司里，那时候的公司真的便宜得太离谱了。随着本金增加，投资的可能性也少了很多。The times were also better for doing it in that time.那是一个好时代。But I think that, if you’re working with a small amount of money, with exactly the same background that Charlie and I have, and same ideas, same whatever ability we have — you know, I think you can make very significant sums.如果你只有很少的本金，而且有跟查理和我一样的想法、经历和能力，我觉得你就可以挣到很多很多的钱。But you — but as soon as you start getting the money up into the millions — many millions — the curve on expectable results falls off just dramatically. But that’s the nature of it.但当你的本金累积到了几百万美元，收益率曲线就会快速下滑，这是很自然的事情。You’ve got to — you know, when you get up to things you could put millions of dollars into, you’ve got a lot of competition looking at that. And they’re not looking as I did when I started. When I started, I went through the pages of the manuals page by page.当你找到一个能投上百万美元的公司，你就会发现有很多人也在盯着它。而且他们不像我一开始一样，我那时候是一页页地翻手册。I mean, I probably went through 20,000 pages in the Moody’s industrial, transportation, banks and finance manuals. And I did it twice. And I actually, you know, looked at every business. I didn’t look very hard at some.我一页页地翻过 2 万页左右的穆迪公司手册，工业、交通、银行、金融等等的公司手册。这些手册我都看了两遍，而且我真的是一家家公司看，虽然一些公司我看得不仔细。Well, that’s not a practical way to invest tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. So I would say, if you’re working with a small sum of money and you’re really interested in the business and willing to do the work, you can — you will find something.但这个方法不适合本金数以亿计的投资，但如果你的本金不多，而且对公司感兴趣，也愿意这样做，那就肯定可以找到些好的标的。There’s no question about it in my mind. You will find some things that promise very large returns compared to what we will be able to deliver with large sums of money.你可以找到一些预期回报率很高的公司，而且毫无疑问，你的回报率会比那些持有大本金的投资者好得多。Charlie?查理？CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yeah, I think that’s right. A brilliant man who can’t get any money from other people, and is working with a very small sum, probably should work in very obscure stocks searching out unusual mispriced opportunities.查理芒格：说得很对。一个聪明人，不是从别人那里得到本金，而且只有很少的本金，应该去找找那些不起眼的公司，和那些错误定价的机会。WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, most smart people, unfortunately, in Wall Street figure that they can make a lot more money a lot easier just by, one way or another, you know, getting an override on other people’s money or delivering services in some way that people —巴菲特：是的。很不幸的是，在华尔街大部分聪明人发现，从别人那里拿钱是更快的方法，用别人的钱来挣钱或者是提供一些服务…And the monetization of hope and greed, you know, is a way to make a huge amount of money. And right now, it’s very — just take hedge funds.这些滋生了贪婪和欲望，而且这是挣钱最快的方法，就拿对冲基金来举例。I mean, it’s — I’ve had calls from a couple of friends in the last month that don’t know anything about investing money. They’ve been unsuccessful and everything else. And, you know, one of them called me the other day and said, “Well, I’m forming a small hedge fund.” A hundred and twenty-five million he was talking about.上个月，我接到了一个完全不懂投资的朋友的一通电话，他们以前做的事情没有一个是成功的。说他们最近成立了一个小的对冲基金，所谓的“小对冲基金”也有 1.25 亿美元的规模。Like, the thought that since it was only 125 million, maybe we ought to put in 10 million or something of the sort.然后说，我们只有 1.25 亿美元，或许我们应该投 1000 万美元到这里或者那里。I mean, if you looked at this fellow’s Schedule D on his 1040 for the last 20 years, you know, you’d think he ought to be mowing lawns. (Laughter)我的意思是，如果你仔细看看注册发行表里面他过去 20 年的经历，你会觉得他应该只能干点修草坪的活儿。（全场笑）But he may get his 125 million. I mean, you know, it’s just astounding to me how willing people are, during a bull market, just to toss money around, because, you know, they think it’s easy.但是他却能凑到 1.25 亿美元，我真的很震惊。在牛市的时候，人们以为做什么都能赚钱，他们就会乱投资。And of course, that’s what they felt about internet stocks a few years ago. They’ll think it about something else next year, too.当然了，这就是几年前他们对互联网公司的感觉。过几年他们又会对其他东西有这样的感觉。But the biggest money made, you know, in Wall Street in recent years, has not been made by great performance, but it’s been made by great promotion, basically.在华尔街，挣钱，不是通过公司的出色表现，而是通过出色的营销。本质上就是这样。Charlie, do you have anything?查理，你还有什么要说的吗？CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would state it even more strongly. I think the current scene is obscene. I think there’s too much mania. There’s too much chasing after easy money. There’s too much misleading sales material about investments. There’s too much on the television emphasizing speculation in stocks.查理芒格：说得很对。在我看来现在很疯狂，太狂热了。太多人在追逐热钱，投资方也在夸大宣传，媒体也在追捧股票投机。
理念随笔
读什么书
俺自己的穷查理宝典（1）
俺自己的穷查理宝典（2）
投资随笔
简单的复利
什么是好模式？什么又是好公司、好价格？
在烂模式下的好公司？
啥是好价格？
选择自己的能力圈
所谓投资就是算出“自由现金流”
用买产业的心态去买公司
公司随笔
如何运营一个“免费”的动物园
麦当劳的另一面
伯克希尔的另一面
伯克希尔随笔
1994年伯克希尔年会：做简单的事情，也可以很出色
1994年伯克希尔年会：预测股价是自欺欺人的游戏
1994年伯克希尔年会：怎么看待买公司股票和收购公司
1994年伯克希尔年会：不太关心市场利率的走向
1994年伯克希尔年会：伯克希尔从不回购股票的原因
1994年伯克希尔年会：不喜欢用Sell Put的方式买股票
1994年伯克希尔年会：业务不增长的公司也可以给投资人带来丰厚回报
1995年伯克希尔年会：伯克希尔最看重承诺和信任
1995年伯克希尔年会：可口可乐不分红和回购是对股东最大的回报
1995年伯克希尔年会：在合作中疑人不用，用人不疑
1997年伯克希尔年会：风险不来自于市场，而是来自于公司
1999年伯克希尔年会：总有聪明人冒着不对称的风险去赚额外收益
1999年伯克希尔年会：如果巴菲特从今天开始拿1万美元做投资
2001年伯克希尔年会：巴菲特犯的大错都是看不见的
2001年伯克希尔年会：区分成长股和价值股，是在胡说八道
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