AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, gentlemen, my name is Jay Parker. I’m from Washington State. And this question regards mistakes. So that being the case, it should probably be directed to Mr. Munger.
听众：两位早上好。我的问题是伯克希尔所犯过的错，所以我估计应该由芒格先生来回答。（之前回答问题时巴菲特调侃说，伯克希尔所有犯过的错都由芒格来回答会比较好）
Mr. Munger, I know you’re fond of evoking humility to promote rational thought. So my question is, what’s the most recent business mistake that you’ve made, Mr. Munger, and why did it occur? (Laughter)
芒格先生，我知道你是理性思考的忠实支持者。我的问题是，最近你在商业上犯过什么错误吗？以及为什么会犯这个错误？（全场笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: I’m going to take notes on this one. (Laughter)
巴菲特：在这个问题上，我应该做做笔记。（全场笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: The mistakes that have been most extreme in Berkshire’s history are mistakes of omission. They don’t show up in our figures. They show up in opportunity costs.
查理芒格：我们犯过的最大的错是“错过”机会，这些“错过”没有出现在我们的投资列表里面，就是机会成本。
In other words, we have opportunities, we almost do it. In retrospect, we can tell that we were very much mistaken not to do it.
换句话说，我们的机会成本非常高，当时几乎就要买了，但我们没买。回过头来看，我们错过了太多的东西。
In terms of the shareholders, those are the ones in our history that it really cost the most. And very few managements do much thinking or talking about opportunity costs. But Warren, we have blown —
从股东回报的角度来看，因为错过这些机会，我们损失了很多本来应该挣到的钱。很少管理层会从机会成本的角度来思考问题，但我们应该至少损失了…
WARREN BUFFETT: Billions and billions and billions. I might as well say it. (Laughter)
巴菲特：…几十亿，上百亿的回报。我直接说了吧。（全场笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: Right, right. And we keep doing it. (Laughter)
查理芒格：是的，是的，而且我们还继续这样做。（全场笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: Some might say we’re getting better at it. (Laughter)
巴菲特：很多人会说，你们干这事儿好像越来越上道了。（全场笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t like mentioning the specific companies, because the — you know, we may, in due course, want to buy them again and have an opportunity to do so at our price.
查理芒格：我不打算提及具体的公司，因为我们有可能再次有机会在碰到合适的价格时去购买他们。
But practically everywhere in life, and in corporate life, too, what really costs, in comparison with what easily might have been, are the blown opportunities. I mean, it just — it’s an awesome amount of money.
但我真的这么认为，在我的生命里，也在经营伯克希尔的这段时间里，这种“本来应该干点什么而没有干”的机会才是真正花了我们大价钱的。
When I was somewhat younger, I was offered 300 shares of Belridge Oil. Any idiot could’ve told there was no possibility of losing money, and a large possibility of making money. I bought it.
当我年轻的时候，我拥有300股的Belridge Oil公司股票。任何一个傻瓜都知道，这是一个不可能亏损的投资，而且很大概率会挣钱。所以，我买了。
The guy called me back three days later, and offered me 1,500 more shares. But this time, I had to sell something to buy the damn Belridge Oil. That mistake, if you traced it through, has cost me $200 million.
而三天之后，对方又来电话问我说，还有1500股要不要。这次我要卖一些东西才能凑够钱，我觉得有点麻烦，所以就没买。回头来看，这让我损失了2个小目标（单位：美元）。
And I — it was all because I had to go to a slight inconvenience and sell something. Berkshire does that kind of thing, too. We never get over it. (Laughter)
而这些仅仅是因为我要稍微麻烦一点，卖掉一些东西来凑钱。伯克希尔也常常干这种事情，而且我们总是重复在干这种事情。（全场笑）
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I might add that when we speak of errors of omission, of which we’ve had plenty, and some very big ones, we don’t mean not buying some stock where we — a friend runs it, or we know the name and it went from one to 100. That doesn’t mean anything. It’s only —
巴菲特：我想补充说明一下。当我们说我们错过一些机会，或者说错过很多很大的机会，我们不是指错过那些我们朋友开的公司；或者是错过那些我们自从知道这家公司的名字之后，它的股价从1块涨到了100块。这些公司对我们而言都毫无意义，这些都不算错过。
We only regard errors as being things that are within our circle of competence. So if somebody knows how to make money in cocoa beans, or they know how to make money in a software company or anything, and we miss that, that is not an error, as far as we’re concerned.
我们仅仅把错过那些在我们能力圈范围之内的公司，视为真正的错过。所以，如果有人知道怎么从可可豆里面挣钱，或者是从软件公司里面挣钱，错过这些都不算什么，对我们而言毫无影响。
What’s an error is when it’s something we understand, and we stand there and stare at it, and we don’t do anything. Or worse yet, what really gets me is when we do something very small with it. We do an eyedropper’s worth of it, when we could do it very big.
真正的错误是有些东西我们完全理解，而且我们有能力做点事情，而且一直关注在着它们，但最终我们没有去做些什么。甚至更加糟糕，我们虽然做了点什么但只是小小地参与了一下。本可以大干一场，结果只动了动手指，这会让我很抓狂。
Charlie refers to that elegantly when I do that sort of thing as when I’m sucking my thumb. (Laughter)
查理常优雅地说，每当我干这种事儿的时候，我就像在吃着自己的大拇指（在犹豫）。（全场笑）
And there really — I mean, we have been thumbsuckers at times with businesses that we understood well. And it may have been because we started buying, and the price moved up a little, and we waited around hoping we would get more at the price we originally started — there could be a lot of things.
这种情况经常发生在我们完全理解的公司，但当我们开始买入的时候，买入价格稍稍上涨了一点，我们就想等一等，希望价格能回到刚开始买入的那附近。这一等就错失了良机。
But those are huge mistakes. Conventional accounting, of course, does not pick those up at all. But they’re in our scorebook.
当然了，传统的会计规则不会把这些错误体现出来的啦。但这些错误都会在我们自己的计分卡上体现出来。
理念随笔
读什么书
俺自己的穷查理宝典（1）
俺自己的穷查理宝典（2）
投资随笔
简单的复利
什么是好模式？什么又是好公司、好价格？
在烂模式下的好公司？
啥是好价格？
选择自己的能力圈
所谓投资就是算出“自由现金流”
用买产业的心态去买公司
公司随笔
如何运营一个“免费”的动物园
麦当劳的另一面
伯克希尔的另一面
伯克希尔随笔
1994年伯克希尔年会：做简单的事情，也可以很出色
1994年伯克希尔年会：预测股价是自欺欺人的游戏
1994年伯克希尔年会：怎么看待买公司股票和收购公司
1994年伯克希尔年会：不太关心市场利率的走向
1994年伯克希尔年会：伯克希尔从不回购股票的原因
1994年伯克希尔年会：不喜欢用Sell Put的方式买股票
1994年伯克希尔年会：业务不增长的公司也可以给投资人带来丰厚回报
1995年伯克希尔年会：伯克希尔最看重承诺和信任
1995年伯克希尔年会：可口可乐不分红和回购是对股东最大的回报
1995年伯克希尔年会：在合作中疑人不用，用人不疑
1997年伯克希尔年会：风险不来自于市场，而是来自于公司
1999年伯克希尔年会：总有聪明人冒着不对称的风险去赚额外收益
1999年伯克希尔年会：如果巴菲特从今天开始拿1万美元做投资
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