GTJW18
2021-04-25
Really?
Boeing 787: The Trend Is Still Up
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{"i18n":{"language":"zh_CN"},"detailType":1,"isChannel":false,"data":{"magic":2,"id":375327444,"tweetId":"375327444","gmtCreate":1619311115888,"gmtModify":1634274374444,"author":{"id":3577494129956329,"idStr":"3577494129956329","authorId":3577494129956329,"authorIdStr":"3577494129956329","name":"GTJW18","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/bdc73e3995547244b0590dcc69b966ef","vip":1,"userType":1,"introduction":"","boolIsFan":false,"boolIsHead":false,"crmLevel":2,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[],"fanSize":3,"starInvestorFlag":false},"themes":[],"images":[],"coverImages":[],"extraTitle":"","html":"<html><head></head><body><p>Really?</p></body></html>","htmlText":"<html><head></head><body><p>Really?</p></body></html>","text":"Really?","highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":1,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"favoriteSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/375327444","repostId":1101553872,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1101553872","pubTimestamp":1619183644,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1101553872?lang=&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-04-23 21:14","market":"us","language":"en","title":"Boeing 787: The Trend Is Still Up","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1101553872","media":"seekingalpha","summary":"Summary\n\nBoeing has recommenced deliveries of the Dreamliner.\nThe aircraft has been a cash cow for B","content":"<p><b>Summary</b></p>\n<ul>\n <li>Boeing has recommenced deliveries of the Dreamliner.</li>\n <li>The aircraft has been a cash cow for Boeing after cost overruns in the billions of dollars.</li>\n <li>Despite lower production rates, cash margins should still be high on the Dreamliner.</li>\n</ul>\n<p class=\"t-img-caption\"><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d84e0f3f54fcb29195d1e32a2feb92ae\" tg-width=\"768\" tg-height=\"512\"><span>Photo by Alvin Man/iStock Editorial via Getty Images</span></p>\n<p>In March, Boeing (BA) finally recommenced deliveries of the Boeing 787 after a delivery stop that was put in place in October 2020. The delivery stop has affected Boeing’s cash collection as a big chunk of payments come in upon delivery but it also added to costs. During the duration of the grounding the actual impact on the cost side of the equation has been unclear, but it certainly has impacted Boeing’s ability to reduce its deferred production costs for the Boeing 787.</p>\n<p>In this analysis, we have a look at what the trend suggests will happen to Boeing's deferred production balance in the first quarter, which serves as a measure of the gap between what Boeing has recognized as profits via program accounting and what was actually realized.</p>\n<p>If you are not familiar with the program accounting method, I would highly recommend reading the explanation in this report after the paragraph discussing the risks and uncertainties.</p>\n<p><b>Risk and uncertainties</b></p>\n<p>I developed the estimation models for the Boeing 787 deferred production cost models years ago, often able to predict the deferred production cost balances within 0.5%. Since then, uncertainties have significantly increased and with the information available it's not always possible to provide counterbalance to these uncertainties in the estimate.</p>\n<p>Therefore, I want to discuss several risks or uncertainties that could drive significant difference between estimates and actual realized results and I believe that investors should be informed about those possible discrepancies.</p>\n<p>Currently there are four uncertainties that can adversely impact the deferred production balance:</p>\n<ol>\n <li>Loss of gains in the production system due to lower production rates.</li>\n <li>Future adjustments to the production rate.</li>\n <li>Inventory built up due to inspections on the fuselage joins of the Boeing 787.</li>\n <li>The costs associated to the fuselage join inspections.</li>\n</ol>\n<p>All of these elements infuse the deferred production balance trajectory with uncertainty and may contribute to a possible reach-forward loss recognition on the Boeing 787 program, though at this point there's extremely limited visibility on a potential forward loss as Boeing as provided extremely little detail on the costs of the grounding.</p>\n<p><b>Program accounting</b></p>\n<p class=\"t-img-caption\"><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/ca654b70dbe1aa65061fddc3fd03e1f2\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"428\"><span>Source: Forbes</span></p>\n<p>Boeing uses program accounting for its commercial aircraft programs instead of unit cost accounting. To understand what the deferred costs are, it's important to know how program accounting works. On programs where initial production costs are high, such as aircraft programs, it does make sense to amortize costs over a wider number of productions than just on the few initial productions. In other words, costs are spread out over an accounting block and are not only the costs that are spread out but also the revenues. For the Boeing 787 program, the accounting block currently stands at 1,500 units as Boeing reduced the accounting quantity in the previous quarter.</p>\n<p>Boeing says that the units in the accounting block are units of which it can credibly estimate costs and revenues, but should not be considered an indication for a breakeven point. Unless the company has set an average program margin of 0% - which it has not - a zero deferred balance indeed is no indication of a breakeven point and should not be considered as such. Currently, however, the program margins are close to breakeven.</p>\n<p>Analysts pay close attention to the deferred balance and so should investors. The reason is that it's likely Boeing needs to recognize a charge if it has not zeroed out the deferred costs by the 1,500th delivery (the number of units in the accounting quantity) or announce a (demand driven) block extension.</p>\n<p>Simultaneously, one should be aware of the fact that if Boeing zeroes out its deferred balance by the 1,500th delivery, it actually will have realized the profits that it estimated for the accounting block and the profits it has been reporting for the program valid after all. Even if Boeing does not zero out the balance by the last delivery and has to recognize a charge, it can still have booked a profit if the recognized charge is lower than the realized program profit.</p>\n<p>The assumption for costs and revenues means that Boeing assumes an average profit figure for each of the aircraft it currently delivers. If the actual profit figure is lower than the assumed profit, the deferred balance rises. If the profit is higher than the assumed profit, the deferred balance declines. So, the deferred balance tells you how profitable or unprofitable the program has been to date vs. the assumed program profits.</p>\n<p><b>Total deferred production balance</b></p>\n<p class=\"t-img-caption\"><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/beaeec389882399b4b95d31e07293aae\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"359\"><span>Figure 1: Accumulated total balance per quarter (Source: AeroAnalysis)</span></p>\n<p>In the fourth quarter of 2020, the balance for the Dreamliner program dropped to $16.8B, which is a $470 million quarter-over-quarter decrease. That was a decline that suggests that Boeing is able to burn off part of the deferred production balance while a certain aircraft might not be delivered yet. If that is indeed what's happening that provides Boeing with a stronger base to keep reducing the deferred production balance in the coming quarters while production could be outpacing deliveries.</p>\n<p class=\"t-img-caption\"><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fd00a3376256b96f43a9fec908dde814\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"352\"><span>Figure 2: Total balance improvement per unit per quarter (Source: AeroAnalysis)</span></p>\n<p>The cost-cutting ramp up has been more or less linear over the past 15-plus quarters, but that has started to flatten. In Q1 2020, there was a huge jump in the per unit decrease that was not caused by some extraordinary efficiency gain in the system but was caused by low deliveries in combination with the decrease in the accounting quantity which allowed \"more space\" on previous deliveries to burn off the balance.</p>\n<p>In Q4 2020, Boeing reduced the deferred production balance by $470 million. Based on the data from the previous 20-plus quarters, I'm hoping the decrease will be at least in the $400 million to $440 million range more or less in line with the previous quarter. Anything above that would be welcome, anything below that would most definitely be disappointing.</p>\n<p><b>Conclusion</b></p>\n<p>The trend in per unit decreases over past quarters would suggest that Boeing could reduce its deferred balance on the Boeing 787 program by as much as $440 million, though uncertainty about the program's profit generation have never been higher, and as I pointed out in aprevious report, Boeing has been inching closer and closer to a reach-forward loss. If that indeed is something that's in the play for Q1 2021 results then instead of posting deferred production reductions Boeing will be recognizing a charge in the amount of the costs exceeding the revenues, though production could still be profitable.</p>\n<p>Boeing's task of zeroing the deferred production balance which normally should have happened around 2023 is flying into trouble, as production rates have decreased. So, what Boeing announces with regard to the burn off is extremely important for the financial trajectory of the Boeing 787, and while I have generally been more positive than many analysts on the Boeing 787 deferred production balance burn off and also have been able to make more accurate estimates, at this point I can only admit that things are very challenging for the Dreamliner program.</p>\n<p>For now, Boeing could still be reducing the deferred production balance, but if there will be significant additional cost growth on the program, a reach-forward loss cannot be avoided. On the positive side, if Boeing sees sufficient demand to increase production again, that should have some positive impact on the costs of production for the Dreamliner. So, what I'm seeing that the Dreamliner is still bringing in cash and profits, but it might not be high enough to completely zero the deferred production balance. In the end, what matters to me is that on unit cost and cash cost the Boeing 787 is still performing well, meaning that when airlines can take delivery of the Dreamliner again it should positively impact Boeing’s cash flow, it’s just the accounting background against which the Boeing 787 has to perform is somewhat grim with a challenging recovery profile for international traffic layered on top of that.</p>","source":"seekingalpha","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Boeing 787: The Trend Is Still Up</title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 11px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;line-height: 11px;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nBoeing 787: The Trend Is Still Up\n</h2>\n\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\n\n2021-04-23 21:14 GMT+8 <a href=https://seekingalpha.com/article/4420399-boeing-787-trend-is-still-up><strong>seekingalpha</strong></a>\n\n\n</h4>\n\n</header>\n<article>\n<div>\n<p>Summary\n\nBoeing has recommenced deliveries of the Dreamliner.\nThe aircraft has been a cash cow for Boeing after cost overruns in the billions of dollars.\nDespite lower production rates, cash margins ...</p>\n\n<a href=\"https://seekingalpha.com/article/4420399-boeing-787-trend-is-still-up\">Web Link</a>\n\n</div>\n\n\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"BA":"波音"},"source_url":"https://seekingalpha.com/article/4420399-boeing-787-trend-is-still-up","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/5a36db9d73b4222bc376d24ccc48c8a4","article_id":"1101553872","content_text":"Summary\n\nBoeing has recommenced deliveries of the Dreamliner.\nThe aircraft has been a cash cow for Boeing after cost overruns in the billions of dollars.\nDespite lower production rates, cash margins should still be high on the Dreamliner.\n\nPhoto by Alvin Man/iStock Editorial via Getty Images\nIn March, Boeing (BA) finally recommenced deliveries of the Boeing 787 after a delivery stop that was put in place in October 2020. The delivery stop has affected Boeing’s cash collection as a big chunk of payments come in upon delivery but it also added to costs. During the duration of the grounding the actual impact on the cost side of the equation has been unclear, but it certainly has impacted Boeing’s ability to reduce its deferred production costs for the Boeing 787.\nIn this analysis, we have a look at what the trend suggests will happen to Boeing's deferred production balance in the first quarter, which serves as a measure of the gap between what Boeing has recognized as profits via program accounting and what was actually realized.\nIf you are not familiar with the program accounting method, I would highly recommend reading the explanation in this report after the paragraph discussing the risks and uncertainties.\nRisk and uncertainties\nI developed the estimation models for the Boeing 787 deferred production cost models years ago, often able to predict the deferred production cost balances within 0.5%. Since then, uncertainties have significantly increased and with the information available it's not always possible to provide counterbalance to these uncertainties in the estimate.\nTherefore, I want to discuss several risks or uncertainties that could drive significant difference between estimates and actual realized results and I believe that investors should be informed about those possible discrepancies.\nCurrently there are four uncertainties that can adversely impact the deferred production balance:\n\nLoss of gains in the production system due to lower production rates.\nFuture adjustments to the production rate.\nInventory built up due to inspections on the fuselage joins of the Boeing 787.\nThe costs associated to the fuselage join inspections.\n\nAll of these elements infuse the deferred production balance trajectory with uncertainty and may contribute to a possible reach-forward loss recognition on the Boeing 787 program, though at this point there's extremely limited visibility on a potential forward loss as Boeing as provided extremely little detail on the costs of the grounding.\nProgram accounting\nSource: Forbes\nBoeing uses program accounting for its commercial aircraft programs instead of unit cost accounting. To understand what the deferred costs are, it's important to know how program accounting works. On programs where initial production costs are high, such as aircraft programs, it does make sense to amortize costs over a wider number of productions than just on the few initial productions. In other words, costs are spread out over an accounting block and are not only the costs that are spread out but also the revenues. For the Boeing 787 program, the accounting block currently stands at 1,500 units as Boeing reduced the accounting quantity in the previous quarter.\nBoeing says that the units in the accounting block are units of which it can credibly estimate costs and revenues, but should not be considered an indication for a breakeven point. Unless the company has set an average program margin of 0% - which it has not - a zero deferred balance indeed is no indication of a breakeven point and should not be considered as such. Currently, however, the program margins are close to breakeven.\nAnalysts pay close attention to the deferred balance and so should investors. The reason is that it's likely Boeing needs to recognize a charge if it has not zeroed out the deferred costs by the 1,500th delivery (the number of units in the accounting quantity) or announce a (demand driven) block extension.\nSimultaneously, one should be aware of the fact that if Boeing zeroes out its deferred balance by the 1,500th delivery, it actually will have realized the profits that it estimated for the accounting block and the profits it has been reporting for the program valid after all. Even if Boeing does not zero out the balance by the last delivery and has to recognize a charge, it can still have booked a profit if the recognized charge is lower than the realized program profit.\nThe assumption for costs and revenues means that Boeing assumes an average profit figure for each of the aircraft it currently delivers. If the actual profit figure is lower than the assumed profit, the deferred balance rises. If the profit is higher than the assumed profit, the deferred balance declines. So, the deferred balance tells you how profitable or unprofitable the program has been to date vs. the assumed program profits.\nTotal deferred production balance\nFigure 1: Accumulated total balance per quarter (Source: AeroAnalysis)\nIn the fourth quarter of 2020, the balance for the Dreamliner program dropped to $16.8B, which is a $470 million quarter-over-quarter decrease. That was a decline that suggests that Boeing is able to burn off part of the deferred production balance while a certain aircraft might not be delivered yet. If that is indeed what's happening that provides Boeing with a stronger base to keep reducing the deferred production balance in the coming quarters while production could be outpacing deliveries.\nFigure 2: Total balance improvement per unit per quarter (Source: AeroAnalysis)\nThe cost-cutting ramp up has been more or less linear over the past 15-plus quarters, but that has started to flatten. In Q1 2020, there was a huge jump in the per unit decrease that was not caused by some extraordinary efficiency gain in the system but was caused by low deliveries in combination with the decrease in the accounting quantity which allowed \"more space\" on previous deliveries to burn off the balance.\nIn Q4 2020, Boeing reduced the deferred production balance by $470 million. Based on the data from the previous 20-plus quarters, I'm hoping the decrease will be at least in the $400 million to $440 million range more or less in line with the previous quarter. Anything above that would be welcome, anything below that would most definitely be disappointing.\nConclusion\nThe trend in per unit decreases over past quarters would suggest that Boeing could reduce its deferred balance on the Boeing 787 program by as much as $440 million, though uncertainty about the program's profit generation have never been higher, and as I pointed out in aprevious report, Boeing has been inching closer and closer to a reach-forward loss. If that indeed is something that's in the play for Q1 2021 results then instead of posting deferred production reductions Boeing will be recognizing a charge in the amount of the costs exceeding the revenues, though production could still be profitable.\nBoeing's task of zeroing the deferred production balance which normally should have happened around 2023 is flying into trouble, as production rates have decreased. So, what Boeing announces with regard to the burn off is extremely important for the financial trajectory of the Boeing 787, and while I have generally been more positive than many analysts on the Boeing 787 deferred production balance burn off and also have been able to make more accurate estimates, at this point I can only admit that things are very challenging for the Dreamliner program.\nFor now, Boeing could still be reducing the deferred production balance, but if there will be significant additional cost growth on the program, a reach-forward loss cannot be avoided. On the positive side, if Boeing sees sufficient demand to increase production again, that should have some positive impact on the costs of production for the Dreamliner. So, what I'm seeing that the Dreamliner is still bringing in cash and profits, but it might not be high enough to completely zero the deferred production balance. In the end, what matters to me is that on unit cost and cash cost the Boeing 787 is still performing well, meaning that when airlines can take delivery of the Dreamliner again it should positively impact Boeing’s cash flow, it’s just the accounting background against which the Boeing 787 has to perform is somewhat grim with a challenging recovery profile for international traffic layered on top of that.","news_type":1},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":197,"commentLimit":10,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"symbols":[],"verified":2,"subType":0,"readableState":1,"langContent":"EN","currentLanguage":"EN","warmUpFlag":false,"orderFlag":false,"shareable":true,"causeOfNotShareable":"","featuresForAnalytics":[],"commentAndTweetFlag":false,"andRepostAutoSelectedFlag":false,"upFlag":false,"length":7,"xxTargetLangEnum":"ORIG"},"commentList":[],"isCommentEnd":true,"isTiger":false,"isWeiXinMini":false,"url":"/m/post/375327444"}
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